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Government Imprudence and Judicial 
Decisions in Domicile Reservations: A 
Comparative Analysis between India and the 
United States 
Tania Sebastian
INTRODUCTION
The labyrinth of anachronism relating to the concept of 
ownership of resources by the state that can be used by its own 
residents, the resulting burden on interstate commerce, accompanied 
by the rationale of reducing unemployment in the state, the 
impediments that affect the free flow of labor, and the constitutional 
defects in the state’s role and its function in the local hiring plan, are 
all issues that courts have to remedy. 
This Article compares the hiring practices and preferences of 
local residents in the United States of America (U.S.) with India. 
Such analysis is relevant as level playing field doctrines have been 
used indefinitely to justify specific reservations in employment. 
While reservations for backward communities come within the 
constitutional scheme of India, this Article probes into the 
acceptance and constitutionality of reservations in employment. 
Further, this Article looks into the constitutionality of vertical 
reservations and justifications given by states for these types of 
reservations. The continued litigation in this area, even with 
decisions of the Supreme Court of India striking down unjustifiable 
vertical reservations for domicile preferences, speaks volumes 
about governments’ imprudence relating to notifications for 
resident-based hires and domicile preferences given to residents. 
The Supreme Court of India has also been riddled with the 
calculations and implementation of horizontal reservations. Various 
state high courts in India have shown indecisiveness in their 
judgments with contradictory positions. These observations are made 
in light of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause and Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. In short, the United States’ justifications 
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and court decisions can be examined and contrasted with the Indian 
jurisprudence as a learning experience for both nations.  
Both nations have set legislative boundaries stipulating 
what is and what is not acceptable as a hiring preference 
depending upon the use of local human resources and natural 
resources, which are then tested by the judiciary for validity. In 
examining the need to uphold local hiring principles, courts have 
tested these hiring preferences using constitutional and statutory 
principles. On the other hand, the main legislative aim is to 
reduce unemployment in the respective states.  
This Article restricts its analysis to the Alaska Hire doctrine 
and looks at an aspect that deals more with employment rather 
than control over natural resources,1 so that a comparison with 
India can be explored. This analytical restriction is necessary as 
the comparative system of India primarily focuses on employment 
under the analogous resident hire principle envisaged as an 
exception to Article 16 of the Constitution of India.2 The limitation 
of this Article lies in the difference in the structure of governance 
of both nations, with the U.S. government functioning as a federal 
form of government and India as a combination of federal and 
unitary.3 The difference in the division of powers results in states 
behaving differently and having varying rationales in judgments 
across the two jurisdictions. In spite of these differences, the 
regulation of interstate commerce and interstate movement in the 
two legal regimes are scrutinized in this Article.  
I. INDIA
A. Affirmative Action and Vertical Reservation in the Indian 
Framework 
Local hiring preferences cannot be discussed in a vacuum 
without the background of affirmative action. The history of 
discrimination and subjugation is sought to be remedied by 
affirmative action. Affirmative action is a remedy to past 
discrimination faced by minorities and is utilized to ensure that 
there is a better position to place them in this compassionate 
scheme of the Constitution of India.4 It is designed to remedy 
the systematic unfairness that ran through centuries and 
1 See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 172–73 (Alaska 1977).  
2 See INDIA CONST. art. 16. 
3 See CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 11 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA
617–18 (Nov. 17, 1949) (stating that the Constitution of India does not present itself as 
federal or unitary, but a peculiar combination of both). 
4 See M. Varn Chandola, Affirmative Action in India and the United States: the 
Untouchable and Black Experience, 3 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 101–02 (1992). 
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generations.5 These minorities were predominately based on 
gender, caste, and religion.  
Courts in India (and the U.S.) have upheld the constitutional 
mandates of affirmative action,6 with the simple logic of treating 
all citizens as equal,7 while recognizing that unequals cannot be 
treated equally.8 The Indian Constitution, in fact, expressly 
provides for affirmative action and “reservations,” or quotas.9 These 
reservations are for backward classes of citizens, and include, as 
part of the constitutional scheme, Schedule Castes, Schedule Tribes, 
and Other Backward Castes.10 These groups are bound together by 
the terminology of vertical reservation. Horizontal reservations 
are for categories of persons with disabilities, women, and 
ex-servicemen; vertical reservation encompasses domicile-based 
reservation.11 Various cases discussed in the forthcoming parts of 
this Article have understood that horizontal reservation cuts 
across vertical reservation and that the most effective manner in 
which both vertical and horizontal reservations can co-exist is 
through inter-locking reservation.12 Candidates selected against 
the quota for horizontal reservation will be placed within the 
vertical reservation in the appropriate category. This appropriate 
category depends upon their original category to which they belong 
in the roster meant for reservation of Schedule Castes, Schedule 
Tribes, and Other Backward Castes. 
B. The Beginning: Horizontal Reservations in India  
Horizontal reservation is a reservation for women and 
persons with physical handicaps under Article 16 of the 
Constitution of India.13 Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India 
states that in matters of public employment, “[t]here shall be 
equality of opportunity for all citizens.”14 Article 16(3) mentions 
an exception to this rule:  
Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law 
prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or 
appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or 
5 See id. at 101.  
6 See, e.g., Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India, 1981 AIR 
298 (India); State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, 1976 AIR 490 (India). 
7 See INDIA CONST. art. 14. 
8 See Chandola, supra note 4, at 107. 
9 Id. at 105–06.  
10 See id. at 106.  
11 What is Vertical Reservation and Horizontal Reservation?, GOVTSTAFFNEWS,
http://govtstaffnews.in/what-is-vertical-reservation-and-horizontal-reservation/ 
[http://perma.cc/RD5L-7DLB]. 
12 See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477, para. 95 (India). 
13 INDIA CONST. art. 16. 
14 INDIA CONST. art. 16, § 1. 
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other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as 
to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such 
employment or appointment.15
As one of the two types of reservation, horizontal reservation is 
named as such for simplifying the types of reservation and 
affirmative action envisaged under the Constitution of India.  
The Indian judicial trend in deciding cases under Article 
16(3) includes the Supreme Court and the High Court decisions of 
various states. For example, a Uttarakhand High Court decision 
in March 2018 dealt with a ten percent horizontal reservation as 
advertised by the government that was ultimately declared 
unconstitutional.16 The government’s stance and notification were 
scrutinized under Article 16.17 The contention was that the 
Government Order (G.O.) dated August 11, 2004, provided persons 
who are domiciled in the State of Uttarakhand and are identified 
as “andolankaris” (those who had participated in the Uttarakhand 
movement and have sustained injury during that movement and 
remained in jail for seven days or more) with horizontal 
reservation.18 However, the G.O. was never a Government Order. 
Instead, it was a Circular issued by the Principal Secretary, 
Government of Uttarakhand, that was not notified in the State 
Gazette, and had been held unconstitutional in an earlier case.19
Nevertheless, the Government of Uttarakhand issued 
Circulars from time to time for appointment of “andolankaris” for 
Group “C” and Group “D” posts20—an action that the court found 
arbitrary. Pointing out the government’s imprudence, Justice 
Lokpal stated that such a provision that flows from the G.O. “does 
not come within the ambit of provisions of Article 16(4) of the 
Constitution of India” that speaks about “provision[s] for the 
reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not 
15 Id. at art. 16, § 3. 
16 See In the matter of appointments of activists on Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ posts 
under the Uttarakhand Rajya Andolan Ke Ghayal/Jail Gaye Andolankariyon Ki Sewayojan 
Niyamawali, 2010 v. State of Uttarakhand, WP No. 67 of 2011, paras. 22, 26 (Uttaranchal 
HC, Mar. 7, 2018) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52637647/ [http://perma.cc/3KZ6-
VUCK] (following a divided opinion on appeal by a division bench comprising of Justices 
Sudhanshu Dhulia and U.C. Dhyani this case was heard by a single bench). 
17 See id. at paras. 19–22. 
18 See id. at para. 4. 
19 See id. at para. 6. Later in the judgment, more clarity is provided on the fate of the 
Circulars: “It is worth mentioning here that the Circular Letter dated 11.08.2004 was quashed 
by learned Single Judge of this Court, vide judgment and order dated 11.05.2010, passed in 
Writ Petition no. 945 (S/S) of 2007 and connected writ petition, holding the said Government 
Order as violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.” Id. at para. 26. 
20 See id. at paras. 4–5. 
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adequately represented in the services under the State.”21
Further, the callous nature of the government in determining 
the type of reservation is also reflected in the fact that no data 
was collected before issuing the Circulars giving appointments 
to “andolankaris.”22 Justice Lokpal also noted that the 
reservations were to be given without holding any competitive 
examination amongst them23 which is in itself a clear violation 
of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. Justice 
Lokpal goes on to state that “this is not even a reservation, but 
a form of gratuitous or compassionate appointment, which is 
clear violation of Article[s] 14 and 16 of the Constitution of 
India.”24 And further that “the classification of ‘andolankaris’ is 
not based on any intelligible differentia which can distinguish 
‘andolankaris’ from the many left out of the group and secondly 
the classification has no rational relation with the object sought 
to be achieved.”25
C. The Analogous Concept of Resident Hire Principle in India: 
An Example  
In December 2016, a controversial draft amendment to the 
Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules of 
1961 was announced by the Government of Karnataka with the 
aim of providing a one hundred percent reservation for the local 
residents (known as “Kannadigas”) in private sector industries 
(except the Information Technology and Biotechnology sectors).26
This amendment was to be applied across the state for certain 
categories of jobs that had obtained government concessions 
based on land, electricity, water, tax rebate, or deferment of 
tax as per Industrial Policy. A subsequent violation of the draft 
amendment would cancel these government concessions, hence 
compelling the private sector to implement the draft amendment. 
When announced to the public, a host of issues were discussed, 
most of all, the issue of loss of revenue by closing down options of 
hire from other states and its negative impact on labor mobility 
21 Id. at paras. 20(4), 22. 
22 Id. at para. 23. 
23 Id. at paras. 6–7 (citing C.L. no. 1269 of 2004). 
24 Id. at para. 30. 
25 Id. 
26 See generally Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules (1961) 
(India) (demonstrating a lack of reservation for local residents in private sector 
industries); see also Insights into Editorial: Karnataka’s Dangerous New Reservation 
Policy, INSIGHTSIAS (Dec. 26, 2016) (showing that these private sectors have not been 
covered by the Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules of 1961 for a 
period of five years beginning in 2014, hence they were not affected by the draft 
amendment), http://www.insightsonindia.com/2016/12/26/insights-editorial-karnatakas-
dangerous-new-reservation-policy/ [http://perma.cc/MT84-Y7NG]. 
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were brought to the forefront. In India, with mobility enshrined 
in the constitution, statistics show that inter-country mobility for 
job seekers is high.27 This is in consonance with Article 19 of the 
Constitution of India that states that “all citizens shall have the 
right to move freely throughout the territory of India and to 
reside and settle in any part of the territory of India.”28 Other 
than the fundamental right, Article 301 of the Constitution of 
India states that there shall be “[f]reedom of trade, commerce 
and intercourse [s]ubject to the other provisions of this Part, 
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of 
India shall be free.”29 Interestingly, this draft amendment was 
not pushed forward and the draft itself was made unavailable.30
D. The Resident Preference Dilemma Examined: Articles 15 
and 16 of the Constitution of India  
Article 15(2) of the Constitution of India bars discrimination 
on “grounds only of religion, race, caste or sex and place of 
birth . . . .”31 The reasonableness under Article 15 is maintained 
by flexibility given to make special provisions for women and 
children, and to make “any special provision for the advancement 
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes,” should the 
state feel the need to do so.32 Equality of opportunity in matter of 
public employment is found under Article 16 of the Constitution 
of India, which advocates a non-discriminatory policy. Article 
16(2) provides that “no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, 
be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect or, any 
employment or office under the State.”33 Nevertheless, Article 
16(3) states that: 
Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law 
prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or 
appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or 
other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as 
27 See LAVEESH BHANDARI & PAYAL MALIK, INDIA’S BORDERLESS WORKFORCE: A
MANPOWER INDIA WHITE PAPER 8 (2018), https://www.manpower.com/wps/wcm/connect/ 
ec7b7b30-b9c3-4684-afc4-750fdb5e94a8/Indias+Borderless+Workforce.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
[http://perma.cc/W2VL-KDGG].
28 INDIA CONST. art. 19. 
29 Id. at art. 301.  
30 See Insights into Editorial: Karnataka’s Dangerous New Reservation Policy ,
INSIGHTSIAS (Dec. 26, 2016), http://www.insightsonindia.com/2016/12/26/insights-
editorial-karnatakas-dangerous-new-reservation-policy/ [http://perma.cc/MT84-Y7NG]. 
31 INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 2. 
32 Id. at art. 15, § 4. 
33 Id. at art. 16, § 2. 
2019] Chapman Law Review 125 
to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such 
employment or appointment.34
This provision enables the Parliament to carve out an exception to 
Article 16’s non-discrimination mandate based on residence. 
However, state governments have in the past enacted laws 
without parliamentary authorization and/or in the absence of a 
parliamentary enactment permitting them to do so, pursuing 
policies of localism. The Parliament has exercised very little 
control over these policies. Parliament enacted the Public 
Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957 that 
abolished all existing residence requirements in various states and 
provided for exceptions only in the case of the special instances of 
Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, and Himachal Pradesh.35 This 
means that the central government has only given the 
aforementioned states the right to issue directions for setting 
residence requirements. Yet, as Justice P.N. Bhagwati of the 
Supreme Court of India has rightly pointed out,  
[S]ome of the states are adopting “sons of the soil” policies prescribing 
reservation or preference based on domicile or residence requirement 
for employment or appointment to an office under the government of a 
State or any local or other authority or public sector corporation or any 
other corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State.36
In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa 
& Ors,37 the court held that equality of opportunity under 
Article 16 for any office under the state is done by meeting the 
necessary qualifications and further, based on capability. This 
does not act as an impediment to the state prescribing necessary 
qualifications and tests for selection and recruitment for 
government services. Also, the Article applies to employment and 
offices under the state (and subordinates to the state). The state is 
also an authority to lay down conditions of appointment that 
include “mental excellence, . . . physical fitness, sense of discipline, 
moral integrity and loyalty to state.”38
34 Id. at art. 16, § 3.  
35 See generally Public Employment Act, No. 44 of 1957 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/ 
doc/67961/ [http://perma.cc/5HGS-XND8].  
36 Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCR 932, 956–57 (India).  
37 State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCR 771, 790 
(1973) (India).  
38 Dipti Khatri, Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment, ACADEMIKE (Jan. 12, 
2015), https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/equality-opportunity-public-employment/#_edn4 
[http://perma.cc/TUB2-6L34]; see generally MAHENDRA P. SINGH, V. N. SHUKLA’S
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (11th ed. 2008). 
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1. Concerns before the Supreme Court of India 
The foremost concern before the Supreme Court of India was 
determining the correct method of the allocation requirement of 
the reserve category based on the respective state rule. However, 
since the pertinent issue here is the validity of basing employment 
opportunities on domicile, relevant Indian Supreme Court cases 
will be analyzed. In Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan 
And Others,39 the concern emerged regarding the advantage in 
public employment based on the rural/urban divide. This case was 
brought before the Supreme Court of India with a challenge 
against a Circular dated June 10, 1998, issued by the Department 
of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj dealing with the 
procedure to be followed for appointment of teachers during the 
years 1993 to 1999 by way of direct recruitment and is as follows:  
Fixation of Bonus Marks for Domiciles40
Domiciles of Rajasthan 10 Marks 
Resident of District 10 Marks 
Resident of Rural Area of District 5 Marks 
It is relevant that the relaxation of marks was in the Higher 
Secondary School and had an impact on the candidates as there was 
no written examination and selection was based on an interview.41
The contentions by the state government were based on 
geographical classification and the socio-economic backwardness 
of the area.42 The state government argued that residence of a 
district or rural area would be a good classification for selection 
in public employment.43 The state reasoned that villages and 
towns are backward educationally and economically and that 
teachers recruited from urban or forward districts are not 
desirous of teaching in rural areas and relatively backward 
districts.44 Concerns about teacher absenteeism, a pressing issue 
in Indian government school, was also put forth as a reason for 
giving preference to persons living in the same area to be 
recruited as teachers.45 The court noted that none of the 
39 Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan And Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2877, para. 
33 (India). 
40 Id. at paras. 4–5. 
41 Id. at para. 6.  
42 Id. at para. 14.  
43 Id. at para. 35.  
44 Id.
45 Id.
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assumptions by the state government were based upon 
concrete material or data, and that it cannot be presumed that 
all states, villages, and towns are backward educationally or 
economically.46 The court did not find strength in the argument 
that the differentia based on domicile was to encourage 
vernacular language that was to be taught by the teachers at 
the primary level to students and that a teacher from a village 
having the same dialect will be able to teach the students of 
the same district better.47 The court found that: 
[U]ndue accent is being laid on the dialect theory without factual 
foundation. The assertion that dialect and nuances of the spoken 
language varies from district to district is not based upon empirical 
study or survey conducted by the State. Not even specific particulars 
are given in this regard. The stand in the counter-affidavit . . . is that 
“each zone has its distinct language.”48
The court correctly emphasized that if the state government 
wanted to remedy these defects, steps should have been taken to 
notify a language requirement for candidates to apply and not 
make categorization based on domicile. The court stated that this 
notification has “overtones of parochialism [and] is liable to be 
rejected on the plain terms of Art[icle] 16(2) and in the light 
of Art[icle] 16(3).”49 The court went on to further state that “[a]n 
argument of this nature flies in the face of the peremptory 
language of Art[icle] 16(2) and runs counter to our constitutional 
ethos founded on unity and integrity of the nation.”50
The correct interpretation of Article 16 was mentioned in 
Jagdish Negi v. State of U.P., wherein the hill and Uttarakhand 
areas in the State of Uttar Pradesh were taken to be correct 
instances of socially and educationally backward classes of 
citizens, and thereby received a twenty-seven percent reservation 
benefit.51 The court upheld this reservation benefit under 
Article 16 because the state reservations were reasonable based 
on all legitimate claims and relevant factors.52
In State of Maharashtra v. Raj Kumar, the State of 
Maharashtra promulgated a rule with a residential condition for 
employment within the state.53 To be given the advantage of a 
“rural candidate,” the examinee must be from a town or village 
46 Id. at para. 37.  
47 Id. at para. 36. 
48 Id.
49 Id. at para. 14.  
50 Id.
51 Jagdish Negi v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 SC 3505, para. 15 (India). 
52 Id. at para. 16.  
53 AIR 1982 SC 1301, 1301 (India). 
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having type “C” municipality so that knowledge of rural life and 
its problems are known to the candidate and hence the candidate 
will be more suitable for the job that entails work in rural areas. 
The court struck down this rule and held it to be violative of 
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.54 The court stated 
that there was “no nexus between the classification” that the 
state government made and “the object that [was] sought to be 
achieved . . . [since] as the Rule stands any person who may not 
have lived in a village at all can appear for S.S.C. 
Examination . . . [and] become eligible for selection . . . .”55
In A.V.S. Narasimha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh,56 a 
constitutional bench of the Supreme Court of India looked into a 
law enacted by the Parliament under Article 16(3) of the 
Constitution of India and the enabling power under Section 3 of 
the Public Employment Act.57 Domicile preference in public 
employment was provided to the Telengana region of the State of 
Andhra Pradesh.58 A fifteen-year continuous residency was 
required.59 The court held the Act was ultra vires of the 
Constitution of India by stating that even if enacted by the 
Parliament, the court must follow the constitution’s vision of 
equality in employment, and that unless advancements are to be 
made for less developed states, the structure provided under 
Article 16 cannot be disturbed.60
Many of the Supreme Court of India’s cases analyzing the 
issue of domicile preference in public employment deal with a 
peculiar scenario—the state governments have repeatedly 
faltered in deciphering a way to calculate the intricacies of 
deriving how many seats make up the reservation scheme. The 
Supreme Court of India discussed the allocation in cases based 
on women that was to be applicable to issues relating to 
horizontal reservation. In this regard, the Supreme Court of 
India in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, discussed all 
constitutional provisions pertaining to reservations;61 it also 
discussed the principle of horizontal reservation, stating: 
[A]ll reservations are not of the same nature. There are two types of 
reservations, which may, for the sake of convenience, be referred to as 
“vertical reservations” and “horizontal reservations”. The reservations 
in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward 
54 Id.
55 Id. 
56 (1970) 1 SCR 115, 117 (India).  
57 Id. at 119.  
58 Id. at 116.  
59 Id. at 118.  
60 Id. at 121.  
61 AIR 1993 SC 477, 556 (India). 
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classes (under Article 16(4) may be called vertical reservations whereas 
reservations in favour of physically handicapped (under clause (1) of 
Article 16) can be referred to as horizontal reservations. Horizontal 
reservations cut across the vertical reservations — what is called 
inter-locking reservations. To be more precise, suppose 3% of the 
vacancies are reserved in favour of physically handicapped persons; this 
would be a reservation relatable to clause (1) of Article 16. The persons 
selected against this quota . . . will be placed in that quota by making 
necessary adjustments; similarly, if he belongs to open competition 
(O.C.) category, he will be placed in that category by making necessary 
adjustments. Even after providing for these horizontal reservations, the 
percentage of reservations in favour of backward class of citizens 
remains — and should remain — the same.62
In Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of U. P., the Supreme Court of 
India examined the question of distribution of seats under the 
concept of horizontal reservation and went on to clarify the proper 
procedure for determination of horizontal reservation:63
Now, coming to the correctness of the procedure prescribed by the 
revised notification for filling up the seats, it was wrong to direct the 
fifteen per cent special reservation seats to be filled up first and then 
take up the OC (merit) quota (followed by filling of OBC, SC and ST 
quotas). The proper and correct course is to first fill up the OC quota 
(50%) on the basis of merit; then fill up each of the social reservation 
quotas, i.e., SC, ST and BC; the third step would be to find out how 
many candidates belonging to special reservations have been 
selected on the above basis. If the quota fixed for horizontal 
reservations is already satisfied – in case it is an overall horizontal 
reservation – no further question arises. But if it is not so satisfied, 
the requisite number of special reservation candidates shall have to 
be taken and adjusted/accommodated against their respective social 
reservation categories by deleting the corresponding number of 
candidates therefrom. (If, however, it is a case of compartmentalised 
horizontal reservation, then the process of verification and 
adjustment/accommodation as stated above should be applied 
separately to each of the vertical reservations. In such a case, the 
reservation of fifteen percent in favour of special categories, overall, 
may be satisfied or may not be satisfied.)64
This judgment has been followed in Rajesh Kumar Daria 
v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission,65 where the court looked 
into the different modes of calculating horizontal and vertical 
reservation and held that persons belonging to a reserved category 
and appointed to non-reserved posts on their own merit cannot be 
been counted against the reserved quota in the case of vertical 
62 Id.
63 Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., (1995) 5 SCC 173, 185 (India). 
64 Id. at 185.  
65 AIR 2007 SC 3127, 3129–30 (India).  
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reservation.66 This case further elucidated that the principle 
would not be applicable for horizontal reservation and observed:  
The second relates to the difference between the nature of vertical 
reservation and horizontal reservation. Social reservations in favour 
of SC, ST and OBC under Art[icle] 16(4) are “vertical reservations”. 
Special reservations in favour of physically handicapped, women, etc., 
under Art[icle] 16(1) or 15(3) are “horizontal reservations”. Where a 
vertical reservation is made in favour of a backward class under 
Art[icle] 16(4), the candidates belonging to such backward class, may 
compete for non-reserved posts and if they are appointed to the 
non-reserved posts on their own merit, their numbers will not be 
counted against the quota reserved for respective backward class. 
Therefore, if the number of SC candidates, who by their own merit, 
get selected to open competition vacancies, equals or even exceeds the 
percentage of posts reserved for SC candidates, it cannot be said that 
the reservation quota for SCs has been filled. The entire reservation 
quota will be intact and available in addition to those selected under 
Open Competition category. But the aforesaid principle applicable to 
vertical (social) reservations will not apply to horizontal (special) 
reservations. Where a special reservation for women is provided 
within the social reservation for Scheduled Castes, the proper 
procedure is to first to fill up the quota for Scheduled Castes in order 
of merit and then find out the number of candidates among them who 
belong to the special reservation group of “Scheduled Castes-Women”. 
If the number of women in such list is equal to or more than the 
number of special reservation quota, then there is no need for further 
selection towards the special reservation quota. Only if there is any 
shortfall, the requisite number of Scheduled Caste women shall have 
to be taken by deleting the corresponding number of candidates from 
the bottom of the list relating to Scheduled Castes. To this extent, 
horizontal (special) reservation differs from vertical (social) 
reservation. Thus women selected on merit within the vertical 
reservation quota will be counted against the horizontal reservation 
for women.67
The Supreme Court of India, while examining the state 
government notification on horizontal reservation, went on to 
clarify the percentage of reservation in favor of this reserved 
class. As mentioned above, in Indra Sawhney, the Supreme 
Court of India stated that the total person recruited should not 
exceed fifty percent of the reservation.68 This also applies to 
horizontal reservation. Hence, candidates under horizontal 
reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India 
66 Id. at 3130. 
67 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
68 Id. at para. 5. 
2019] Chapman Law Review 131 
should not exceed the fifty percent reservation.69 The foray of 
regionalism in India, the emergence of parochial loyalties with the 
rise and growth of numerous regional political parties, and the 
advantages that these political parties want to gain for themselves 
are influencing governments to make campaign commitments for 
quota based on domicile and have found inroads via these state 
government notifications. The Supreme Court of India observed 
that these parties utilize domicile reservations with a “view to 
gaining advantage for themselves,”70 and that this results in “a 
serious threat . . . to the unity and integrity of the nation and 
[puts] the . . . concept of India as a nation . . . in peril.”71 The court 
emphasized that the spirit of nationhood and the “sons of the soil” 
are not populist demands and are not appeals to be made that are 
69 See Hon. Mr. J. S. Nagamuthu, K.R. Shanthi v. Sec’y to Gov’t, MADRAS HIGH COURT,
para. 14 (Oct. 1, 2012) (India), http://indiankanoon.org/doc/41866200 [http://perma.cc/LQ32-
NU56]. The High Court laid out the process to be used:
First Step: 
(i) As against the number of vacancies identified for open quota, irrespective of 
caste, sex, physically challenged, etc., everyone should be allowed to compete 
based on merits. 
(ii) The meritorious candidates should be first selected as against the above 
vacancies under open quota. 
Second Step: 
(iii) After completing the first step, moving on to the vertical reservation 
categories, selection has to be made for each category from amongst the 
remaining candidates belonging to the particular reserved category 
(vertical) based on merits. 
Third Step: 
(iv) After completing the second step, horizontal reservation which cuts across 
the vertical reservation has to be verified as to whether the required number of 
candidates who are otherwise entitled to be appointed under the horizontal 
reservation have been selected under the vertical reservation. 
(v) On such verification, if it is found that sufficient number of candidates to 
satisfy the special reservation (horizontal reservation) have not been selected, 
then required corresponding number of special reservation candidates shall 
have to be taken and adjusted/accommodated as against social reservation 
categories by deleting the corresponding number of candidates therefrom. 
(vi) Even while filling up the vacancies in the vertical reservation, if, sufficient 
number of candidates falling under the horizontal reservation have been 
appointed, then, there will be no more appointment exclusively under the 
horizontal reservation. 
Caution: 
(vii) At any rate, the candidates who were selected as against a post under open 
quota shall not be adjusted against the reserved quota under vertical reservations.  
Id.; see also CAV Order at para. 19, High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur (2015) (W.P.(S) 
Nos. 869/2015, 870/2015, 871/2015 & 1477/2015) (India), http://cghighcourt.nic.in/Afr/ 
courtJudgementandAFR/2016/Jan/wps869of2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/X3KA-459B]; 
J. Venkatesan, Quota should not exceed 50%, says Supreme Court, THE HINDU (last 
updated Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/Quota-should-
not-exceed-50-says-Supreme-Court/article15210960.ece [http://perma.cc/FS5A-JDVL]. 
70 Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCR 942, 955 (India). 
71 Id.
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contrary to the constitution.72 The Supreme Court of India has 
also warned that special treatment on the basis of residence is 
not to be utilized as a populist appeal by the political parties that 
can break “the unity and integrity of the nation by fostering and 
strengthening narrow parochial loyalties based on language and 
residence within a state.”73
Hence, a permanent resident in a state should not entertain 
the feeling of a preferential claim for appointment opportunity 
into the state government as against another person who is 
deemed to be an outsider, especially irrespective of merit.74 The 
Supreme Court of India has rightfully stated that this “is a 
dangerous feeling [and] if allowed to grow . . . might one day 
break up the country into fragments,”75 reasonable preferential 
policy based on rationale, notwithstanding.  
The Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) peaks a similar 
tone by mentioning that India offers only one citizenship, thereby 
making no distinction between residents of various states, and 
hence there should be an “unfettered right and privilege of 
employment” in any part of the country.76 The members present at 
the CAD, however, expressed concern that persons from any state 
should not be allowed to come from one province to another, “as 
mere birds of passage without any roots, without any connection 
with that particular province, just to come, apply for posts and, so 
to say, take the plums and walk away.”77 And that there should be 
certain limitations that are necessary. The CAD also addressed 
the issue of giving Parliament the power of bringing about 
uniformity to the residential limits in the states.  
On a side note, in Indian cases involving educational 
institutions and admissions to higher educational institutions, 
the domicile privilege is abundant. However, the recent 
jurisprudence in super specialized courses has changed by not 
allowing domicile reservations.78
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 Id.
76 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 7 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA 676 
(Nov. 30, 1949). 
77 Id. at 700.  
78 See Dr. Pradeep Jain, 3 SCR at 951; see also Mukesh Kumar Umar v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh, WP No. 2377/2018, para. 4 (Madhya Pradesh HC, Mar. 7, 2018) (India), 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165550674/ [http://perma.cc/D7KK-GX3F] (contending that there 
“cannot be any discrimination on the basis of place of birth or residence for a [sic] public 
employment but place of residence can be considered for admission to the professional colleges”). 
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2. Concerns before Various High Courts  
In Mukesh Kumar Umar v. State of Madhya Pradesh79 a 
division bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh 
examined a government notification for the recruitment of 
assistant professors that had a substantial upper age requirement 
relaxation for candidates domiciled within the state of Madhya 
Pradesh.80 The upper age limit for candidates domiciled in 
Madhya Pradesh was forty-years old, whereas for candidates 
domiciled outside Madhya Pradesh, the upper age limit was 
between twenty-one to twenty-eight years.81 In the return filed, 
the state has referred to Madhya Pradesh Educational Service 
(Collegiate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1990 subsequently 
amended, whereby the upper age limit was contemplated to be as 
admissible in accordance with the directions/instructions issued by 
the General Administration Department of the state government 
from time to time.82 The notification specifically stated that the 
relaxation in the maximum age limit shall not be granted to 
candidates from outside the state.83 The rationale was that there 
were no recruitments that could take place in the state since the 
year 1993 and hence the residents of the State of Madhya Pradesh 
would be at a disadvantage if the posts were kept open to 
competition from candidates from all over India.84 The court held 
that there cannot be different age limits based only on place of 
birth or place of residence, and that the fault lay with the 
Government of Madhya Pradesh for not conducting timely 
appointments without prolonged gaps in time.85 The court found 
that the state government’s rationale for the regulation had no 
genesis in the constitution.86 The court went on to further reason 
that if the state is unable to make appointments for a number of 
years then it is the state alone, which has to be blamed.87 The 
court found: 
[T]he Constitutional mandate of providing equality of opportunity and 
no discrimination on the basis of place of residence or place of birth 
cannot be permitted to be given a go-bye only for the reason that the 
State was not able to conclude the employment process in the State 
for large number of years.88
79 Mukesh Kumar Umar, WP No. 2377/2018 at paras. 3–4.  
80 Id.
81 Id. at paras. 1, 3 (“As per Circular No. C 3-8/2016/3-1, May 12, 2017, General 
Administration Department.”). 
82 Id. at para. 2.  
83 Id. at para. 3.  
84 Id. at para. 8.  
85 Id. at para. 13. 
86 Id. at paras. 12–13. 
87 Id.
88 Id. at para. 13. 
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In Smt. Prabha Ranjan Gupta v. The State Of Jharkhand And 
Ors, the court had to determine the selection of candidates, 
considering that as part of the same advertisement a few years 
before the initiation of a new advertisement, few candidates were 
appointed.89 Hence, the 0.06% percent reservation—though 
accepted by an earlier Supreme Court of India decision as 
equivalent to one post—was held not applicable in this case as 
certain candidates were already appointed earlier.90 Also, the court 
pointed out the role of domicile in the five percent reservation for 
women is applicable only for domiciles of the State of Jharkhand.91
This appeal was dismissed eventually, as the Petitioner had 
obtained only the minimum qualifying marks, which cannot create 
any right of appointment upon the candidate.92 In Hemanand Mani 
Tripathi v. State of Chhattisgarh,93 age relaxation provided to 
candidates of the State of Chhattisgarh was asked to be 
reconsidered by the Petitioners. The State of Chhattisgarh argued 
that the relaxation to candidates of Chhattisgarh for recruitment to 
the State Civil Services was based, not only on residence, but on a 
host of categories.94 The court held that candidates from other 
states were not barred from writing the examination and are 
eligible to apply for the posts advertised, provided they conform to 
the eligibility criteria prescribed under the Examination Rules.95 So 
while the age relaxation was not interfered with, the court, 
nevertheless, directed the state to consider all those candidates who 
become ineligible because of age limit in the next recruitment 
process, with the liberty to choose other remedies.96
In other cases, different concerns have been added to the 
domicile question. The Union Territory of Pondicherry adopted a 
policy of the central government where all Scheduled Castes or 
Scheduled Tribes, are eligible for posts reserved for Scheduled 
Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates, irrespective of their domiciled 
state which was upheld by the court.97 The court held that “no 
legal infirmity can be ascribed to such a policy and the same 
cannot be held to be contrary to any provision of law.”98
89 Smt. Prabha Ranjan Gupta v. The State Of Jharkhand & Ors., (2014) 3 J.L.J.R. 
204, para. 3 (India). 
90 See id. 
91 Id. at para. 16 (basing its analysis in view of the letter No. 5448 dated 12.9.2011 of 
Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Official Languages Department). 
92 See generally id. 
93 W.P. (S) No. 40856/2009, Chhattisgarh High Court (2010), https://www.keralapsc.gov.in/ 
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=20470&Itemid=15 [http://perma.cc/Ez38-KCK6]. 
94 See generally id.
95 See generally id.
96 See generally id.
97 S. Pushpa v. Sivachanmugavelu, AIR 2005 SC 1038, 1038 (India). 
98 Id.
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A similar question presented itself before a full bench at the 
Delhi High Court, where the court examined whether in Union 
Territories, notifications for government employment can include 
Scheduled Castes from other states.99 The court based its decision on 
an important observation that, “unlike in the case of States, Union 
Territories are within the administrative control of the Union 
Government.”100 It follows that any Scheduled Caste or Scheduled 
Tribe notified by the president, based on the description, would be 
entitled to the benefit of reservation in all Union Territories.101
However, as mentioned in the Constitution of India, states have a 
different administrative arrangement, and hence the position as 
mentioned for the Union Territories would not apply and migrations 
between states would disentitle a person from applying to a 
government position (if tested for constitutional validity).102 The court 
allowed Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates from other 
states to avail relevant reservation benefits for jobs in Delhi.103
II. THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, the principle of equality in employment 
is followed, except in the case of public contracts that have 
sought concessions from the government. This distinction is 
relevant for this Article as the capitalist regime in the U.S. 
supports outsourcing all public works, which differs from the 
socialistic nature of the Constitution of India reflected in its 
economy. Further, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of citizens in the several states.”104 Also known 
as the interstate privileges and immunities clause, this provision 
ensures to “a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the 
same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.”105 In a 
federal structure of government, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause helps “fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, 
sovereign States.”106
99 Deepak Kumar v. District and Sessions Judge, Delhi (2013) 1, Part 2 I.L.R. 519, 
524 (2012) (India). 
100 Id.
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 547–48. 
103 Jayant Sriram, SC/ST from other states eligible for Delhi govt job quota: HC,
INDIAN EXPRESS (Sept. 14, 2012, 12:33 AM), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
others/sc-st-from-other-states-eligible-for-delhi-govt-job-quota-hc/ [http://perma.cc/7GF9-X5CG]. 
104 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
105 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).  
106 Id.
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The U.S. Constitution also contains the Commerce Clause, 
which gives the federal government the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes. . .”107 Additionally, the dormant Commerce 
Clause, a judicial construction read into the Commerce Clause, 
prohibits discrimination or excessive burdens on interstate 
commerce. The Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce 
Clause both lend themselves to the analysis of employment and 
interstate regulation, as discussed below. 
The first issue to be addressed by the Court regarding 
employment equality was whether the movement of persons is 
“commerce” under the interstate Commerce Clause, which was 
confirmed in multiple cases, such as Gloucester Ferry Co. 
v. Pennsylvania108 and Edwards v. California.109 Subsequently, 
Brown v. Anderson noted that a state regulation that adversely 
restricts the interstate flow of labor burdens commerce and may 
violate the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.110 In short, the movement of commerce and any 
restriction therein may become a burden on commerce, and once 
shown to exist, the next question to be looked at is whether it is 
constitutionally tolerable to take on the local interest.111 To 
survive constitutional scrutiny, it is not enough for the state to 
show that it is advancing its own economic interest.  
Another case, Hicklin v. Orberk,112 dealt with Alaska’s 
local hiring plan (Alaska Local Hire Act), which infringed on 
nonresidents’ right to work. The central argument in the case 
was that such infringement went against the fundamentals of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.113 The state responded 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not apply to the 
right to work, especially when the resources and property of the 
state were utilized, and that the Alaska Local Hire Act did not 
violate the Clause under the appropriate standard of review.114
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Alaska Local Hire 
Act violated the Constitution.115 Analyzing past decisions, Justice 
Brennan stated that the Alaska Local Hire Act does not meet 
the strict standards of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
108 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885). 
109 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (“[I]t is settled beyond question that the transportation of 
persons is ‘commerce’, within the meaning of [the Commerce Clause].”). 
110 202 F. Supp. 96, 101–03 (D. Alaska 1962).  
111 See id. at 102–03. 
112 437 U.S. 518, 520 (1978). 
113 Id. at 520–21, 523.  
114 Id. at 528. 
115 See id. at 534. 
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especially since there was no evidence of non-citizens being a 
peculiar source of evil or a major cause of state unemployment.116
Hicklin is not the first case to deal with these issues. For 
example, Corfield v. Coryell dealt with a New Jersey regulation 
limiting the right to fish from New Jersey water to its own 
citizens.117 The court agreed with the legislation, resting its 
argument on New Jersey’s need to protect its depleting natural 
resources and ensure that its supply of shell fish was available to 
New Jersey citizens for their benefit.118 In McCready v. Virginia,
a nonresident challenged Virginia legislation that denied him the 
right to plant oysters in the state.119 The Court upheld the 
legislation and based its argument on the fact that the citizens of 
Virginia and its government owned the land and hence, had the 
power to dispose of those areas vested with them.120 Further, the 
Court stated that the ownership of property in a state, held in 
common by all the citizens of a particular state was:  
[N]ot a privilege and immunity of general [citizenship] but of special 
citizenship. It does “not belong of right to the citizens of all free 
governments,” but only to the citizens of Virginia, on account of the 
peculiar circumstances in which they are placed. . . . They owned it, 
not by virtue of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and domicile 
united; that is to say by virtue of a citizenship confined to that 
particular locality.121
In the landmark case of Toomer v. Witsell,122 the Court set forth 
what has become the modern Privileges and Immunities doctrine. 
Toomer involved a South Carolina statute that discriminated 
against nonresident commercial shrimp fishermen by imposing a 
license fee 100 times greater than that charged to residents.123 The 
Court declared the statute invalid and violative of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause by stating that “[t]he whole ownership 
theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive 
in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have 
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important 
resource.”124 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, “[b]y that statute, 
South Carolina plainly and frankly discriminates against 
non-residents, and the record leaves little doubt but what the 
discrimination is so great that its practical effect is virtually 
116 Id. at 527–28. 
117 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 549 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
118 See id. at 552. 
119 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 392 (1876).  
120 See id. at 395–96. 
121 Id. at 396. 
122 334 U.S. 385, 395–403 (1948).  
123 Id. at 395. 
124 Id. at 402.  
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exclusionary.”125 Expanding on Toomer, a later court stated that 
“the [C]lause seeks to prevent discrimination against nonresidents, 
to further the concept of federalism, and to create a national 
economic unit.”126
The Court in Toomer emphasized that each state had to accord 
substantial equality of treatment to the citizens of the other, and 
developed a two-prong test, which prohibited a state from 
discriminating against nonresidents unless (1) there is substantial 
reason for the difference in treatment, and (2) the discriminatory 
remedy bears a close relation to the state’s objective.127
This is not to say that all kind of restrictions are 
unconstitutional and objectionable. Some of the restrictions for bona 
fide residence requirements for state or municipal employment might 
be acceptable. However, serious objections arise when a domicile 
preference expands into the private sector. This is where the Toomer 
Privileges and Immunities Clause test would come into play to raise 
objections to the unnecessary relegation of nonresidents to last in 
hiring priority. 
Hence, the investigation that a court has to make in each 
case is whether reasons exist for establishing discriminatory 
policies, and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close 
relation to them. The inquiry must also, of course, be conducted 
with due regard for the principle that the states should have 
considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing 
appropriate cures. “Although the Commerce Clause speaks only 
in broad terms of giving Congress authority to ‘regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states’, the Supreme Court has 
often invoked the [C]lause to strike down state legislation that 
unreasonably impedes the flow of commerce across state lines.”128
In other words, the Court has applied the Commerce Clause to 
state and municipal enactments that unreasonably burdened 
interstate commerce.129
Observing the argument put forth by the states in these 
cases, which revolves around the “common property” of the state, 
it can seem to be illusionary since it is more the case of preserving 
employment by closing the same opportunities to nonresidents. In 
the context of the state, regardless of whether the ingredient of 
employment—for example, fishing—can constitute the common 
125 Id. at 397. 
126 Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass’n, 620 P.2d 640, 642 (Alaska 1980).
127 See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398–99.  
128 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 338 (1982) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).  
129 See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 350, 353 (1951). 
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property of the state, it is not an acceptable argument to say that a 
state can “own” any employment. Hence, the restriction analyzed 
in McCready, for example, rightfully lacks a justifying rationale 
when a state attempts to limit employment to its own citizens.
With the passage of time, interpretations continue to lean 
towards invalidating statutes that are prohibitive and restrictive 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce 
Clause. For example, in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,130 the 
Court—while looking at a Virginia law prohibiting vessels owned 
by nonresidents from fishing in Chesapeake Bay—held that “it 
[was] pure fantasy to talk of ‘owning’ wild fish, birds, or 
animals . . . . [u]nder modern analysis, the question is simply 
whether the State ha[d] exercised its police power in conformity 
with the federal laws and Constitution.”131 Interestingly, it was 
not the right to purchase, but the right to plant—as in the case of 
Virginia—and not the right to buy, but to extract that was being 
challenged in the aforementioned cases.  
Like in India, there are cases in the United States that look at 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause 
in a different light. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, the United 
States Supreme Court determined that “[n]othing in the purposes 
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence 
of congressional action, from participating in the market and 
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”132
Similarly, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,133 the Court held that the South 
Dakota Cement Commission did not violate the Commerce Clause 
through its decision to give state buyers an absolute preference in 
fulfilling their requirements for cement in times of shortage. 
“Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state 
sovereignty, the role of each State ‘as guardian and trustee 
for its people,’ and ‘the long recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer . . . to exercise his own independent discretion as to 
parties with whom he will deal.’”134 The Court said that the 
principle of the state, as a market participant, has the freedom to 
favor its own citizens and choose the parties with whom it will 
deal. Other courts have also “noted that a state’s ‘purchase of 
goods and materials for its own end use . . . is not subject to the 
usual Commerce Clause restrictions.’”135 However, “[t]he mere 
130 431 U.S. 265, 284–85 (1977).  
131 Id.
132 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).  
133 447 U.S. 429, 446–47 (1980). 
134 Id. at 436, 438 (citing Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915); quoting United 
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). 
135 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 339 (1982) (citing 
K.S.B. Tech. Sales v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply, 75 N.J. 272 (1977)). 
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fact that it was through its leasing power that Alaska infringed 
the [P]rivileges and [I]mmunities and [I]nterstate [C]ommerce 
[C]lauses does not save the Alaska Hire Act from its 
constitutional infirmities.”136
Another relevant point here is that the Alaska Local Hire 
Act did not apply to private employment or all sectors of oil and 
gas employment, and, thus, the Act has a small impact on the 
nation’s labor pool. Attention has to be drawn to the fact that the 
Act reaches only oil and gas work on state-leased property or jobs 
that are directly related. It might be further argued that the 
domicile status that is available to anyone willing to establish it 
depends on the duration of residence and intention to stay. 
However, one must establish this domicile, which is not 
burden-free. More so, the nonresident migrant has to forfeit 
benefits of citizenship of the former state. Then the questions of 
intent remain: Does he intend to make his new residence his 
permanent residence? It is in this light that a residency 
preference might restrict the flow of labor to the extent that 
persons might be so deterred that even the most qualified among 
them might look elsewhere for jobs, thereby interfering with 
maximization of productivity of the state that enacted these 
restrictions. This would, in turn, impact the economy of the 
concerned state, and eventually discourage investment. Thus, 
these principles of restrictive hire place a burden on interstate 
commerce. The question then becomes this: Whether local 
interests outweigh this burden.137
CONCLUSION
The past cases show the need to engage in conversations about 
a valid reason for encouraging a type of state discrimination that 
will not encroach upon the strict scrutiny required under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and can remain exclusively under the Court’s 
Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  
As with most constitutional guarantees, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause are not absolute. 
States may continue to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens 
so long as there is a valid and substantial reason for so doing. 
This principle has also been upheld in Indian courts. Judicial 
intervention is necessary to make sure that any extreme use of 
local hiring by a state is not practiced in a manner that would 
result in its interference—especially in today’s time—in the 
136 Carl J. Schuman, Domicile Preferences in Employment: The Case of Alaska Hire,
DUKE L.J. 1069, 1092 (1978). 
137 Id. at 1085–89. 
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private sector. Such a result might be a retaliatory use of local 
hiring preferences, producing a “Balkanization of interstate 
commercial activity which the Constitution was intended to 
prevent,”138 an ideal contrary to the constitutional vision of the 
forms of government. This is in consonance with what the United 
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of India have 
stressed: A division on state lines so as to destroy the unified 
fabric of a state, and the values of nationalism and comity are not 
welcome, as these polarize a state and give its citizens an 
advantage which infringes upon the nation as an entity. 
Various remedies of providing manpower programs as an 
alternative means to the local residents and limiting hiring 
preferences to unemployed persons seem logical. This has to be 
done and developed, keeping in mind the need to balance the 
respective state and national interests, and the greater national 
importance of the commodity.  
   
138 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 172–73 n.13 (Alaska 1977) (quoting Douglas 
v. Seacoast Prods. Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977)). 
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